By Gift ChapiOdekina, Abuja
For decades, Section 214 of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution contained one of the most consequential sentences in the country’s federal architecture: that there shall be a police force for Nigeria, and that “no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.” That single clause has been the legal wall blocking every attempt at state policing for twenty-five years.
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The Constitution (Sixth Alteration) Bill, 2026, currently before the National Assembly, tears that wall down entirely — and in its place erects a detailed, if still incomplete, jurisdictional framework that attempts to answer the question Nigerian federalism has long avoided: who polices what, and where does one force’s authority stop and another’s begin?
The Two-Force Architecture
The bill replaces the existing Section 214 with an entirely new provision that establishes two distinct bodies, the Federal Police and State Police as co-equal constitutional creations. The Federal Police is essentially the successor institution to the Nigeria Police Force, retaining nationwide reach but now operating within a defined mandate. Its core responsibility under the new Section 214(5) is the maintenance of public security and preservation of public order throughout the Federation “to the extent provided for under this Constitution or by an Act of the National Assembly”, a language that links its jurisdiction to the Exclusive Legislative List. State Police, by contrast, would be responsible for security and public order within a state’s own constitutional competence, meaning the Concurrent Legislative List and residual state matters.
The Federal Capital Territory receives special treatment: the bill explicitly places Abuja within the Federal Police’s territorial jurisdiction entirely, with the Federal Police directed to establish and maintain “such commands, formations, departments, and operational units within the Federal Capital Territory as may be necessary.” No State Police can operate in the FCT.
The Certification Gateway
Perhaps the most significant jurisdictional device in the bill is the gateway it creates before any State Police can go operational. Under Section 214(3), a State Police cannot begin policing unless two things have happened: the State House of Assembly has passed a law establishing it, and it has been certified as meeting “national minimum standards in the manner prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.”
This certification requirement inserts a federal quality-control mechanism at the very entry point of state policing, ensuring that no governor can simply declare a State Police into existence by fiat. Until a state clears that bar, the Federal Police fills the gap automatically — Section 214(4) makes clear that it “shall continue to perform policing functions in that State” until the State Police is certified as operational. This default-to-federal provision is designed to prevent a security vacuum during the transition period, but it also means the speed of transition to genuine dual policing will depend on how quickly the National Assembly passes the enabling Police Act that sets those minimum standards and how willing or able states are to meet them.
What counts as a “national minimum standard” is left entirely to future legislation. The bill does note, in the Second Schedule amendments, that state laws may prescribe standards higher than the national floor but cannot go below it, a clause the Deputy Speaker Benjamin Kalu later described publicly as a “guardrail” against a race to the bottom.
The Non-Interference Rule and Its Exceptions
The jurisdictional heart of the bill is Section 214(6), which establishes the Federal Police’s non-interference obligation. Once a State Police is operational, the Federal Police “shall not interfere with the operations of any State Police of the internal security affairs of a State”, a sweeping prohibition that marks a fundamental departure from the current arrangement under which the Inspector-General of Police can deploy federal police officers anywhere in the country without a governor’s consent.
The bill carves out three narrow exceptions. First, where there is a complete breakdown of law and order within a State and the State Police is demonstrably unable to contain the threat. Second, where the Governor of the State has actually requested federal intervention. Third, where the State Police is “unable to function owing to administrative, financial or other problems which render it inoperative.” That third exception is notable as it creates a federal re-entry point specifically tied to financial failure, a provision that may prove frequently tested given the funding uncertainties discussed elsewhere.
Critically, all three exceptions share a common procedural requirement: any intervention “shall only be made after approval by the National Police Council.” This means the President cannot unilaterally deploy the Federal Police against a state’s wishes at least in theory. The National Police Council, whose composition the bill significantly expands and renames from the existing Nigeria Police Council, becomes the body that approves federal incursions into what would otherwise be state security territory.
Separate Command, Parallel Accountability
The bill is careful to keep the two forces’ chains of command structurally separate. The Federal Police is headed by an Inspector-General of Police, appointed by the President on the advice of the National Police Council and confirmed by the National Assembly.
The President, or a minister he authorises, may give the Inspector-General “lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order.”
Each State Police, by contrast, is headed by a Commissioner of Police appointed by the Governor on the National Police Council’s advice, subject to State House of Assembly’s confirmation.
The Governor holds the same directive power over his Commissioner that the President holds over the Inspector-General with one important difference. The bill includes a proviso that if a Commissioner feels a governor’s direction is “unlawful or contradicts general policing standards or practice,” he may refer the matter to the National Police Council, whose decision shall be final. No equivalent referral mechanism exists for the Inspector-General in relation to the President’s directives, a structural asymmetry that critics of the bill may raise during legislative debate.
The bill also addresses the removal of both officers in near-identical terms: the Inspector-General can only be removed by the President on the National Police Council’s recommendation, and only with a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly. A Commissioner can only be removed by the Governor on the Council’s recommendation, with two-thirds majority of the State House of Assembly. In both cases, the grounds for removal are identical: grave misconduct, breach of the Police Act, criminal conviction for fraud or dishonesty, bankruptcy, or mental incapacity.
The Concurrent Powers Carve-Out
Beyond the direct constitutional provisions, the bill alters the Second Schedule to create a new paragraph 20B in the Concurrent Legislative List, which sets out what the National Assembly may legislate on with respect to policing.
The list which is broad covers the Federal Police’s structure and powers, state policing powers, national minimum standards, “policing standards, inspection, certification, complaints, criminal information systems, inter-governmental cooperation, federal intervention, use of force, firearms, grants and accountability.” Essentially, the National Assembly retains broad supervisory legislative authority over the entire policing ecosystem, even after state forces are established.
The bill, however, is explicit that this legislative authority does not translate into operational control: “No Act of the National Assembly made under this paragraph shall confer on any federal authority routine command, deployment, appointment, promotion, transfer, suspension, dismissal or disciplinary control over any member of a State Police.” The enforcement of national minimum standards, it adds, “shall not amount to routine operational or personnel control over a State Police.” This is the bill’s clearest statement of the jurisdictional firewall: setting the standards is federal business; running the force, day to day, is a state matter
Following the Money — How State Police Would Be Funded
Of all the contested questions surrounding Nigeria’s proposed State Police, funding is the one that the constitutional amendment bill answers least.
The document that establishes two new police institutions, restructures command hierarchies, redraws the Second Schedule, and creates new governance bodies at both federal and state levels, addresses the issue of funding in a single, twenty-four-word sentence. That brevity is not accidental and it is already generating a political conversation that runs well ahead of what the bill actually says.
What the Bill Says
The primary funding obligation in the bill rests with the states themselves. In the amendments to the Second Schedule, Paragraph 20B(2) gives a state House of Assembly the power to make laws for the “establishment, organisation, administration, funding, and oversight” of a State Police placing fiscal responsibility squarely at the state level.
There is no federal minimum funding obligation, no formula, no guaranteed revenue stream. If a state wants a police force, it must create and pay for it.
The federal contribution is captured in a new Section 216A, inserted immediately after the provisions on the removal of the Commissioner of Police. It reads, in its entirety: “The Federal Government shall provide grants or aid to State Police on the recommendation of the National Police Council subject to the approval of the National Assembly.” That is the full extent of the bill’s funding architecture.
There is no specification of how large these grants should be, on what basis the National Police Council would recommend them, how frequently they would be reviewed, or which states would qualify. The discretion is total.
The process built into Section 216A is also worth examining for what it tells us about leverage. For a state to receive federal funding support, the National Police Council which the President chairs and which is stacked with federal and multi-state representation — must first recommend the grant, and the National Assembly must then approve it.
A state whose politics are at odds with the federal executive could theoretically find its grant applications stalled at either checkpoint. The bill provides no independent or automatic trigger for federal funding to flow.
The Contrast with the Armed Forces
The starkness of this arrangement becomes clearer when set against the companion legislation sitting just pages away in the same package of prioritised bills. Bill No. 8 — the Constitution (Sixth Alteration) Bill for the Financial Independence of the Armed Forces — proposes amending Section 81 of the Constitution to add the Armed Forces to the list of bodies whose allocations are paid directly and automatically from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, on the same model as the National Assembly, the Judiciary, and the Independent National Electoral Commission. That is a first-line charge: money flows without annual appropriation battles or political approval cycles.
State Police get no equivalent protection. They are not placed on the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Their federal support is discretionary, two-step gated, and explicitly conditional on the approval of institutions the federal government controls.
The disparity is structurally significant: the national military will, if both bills pass, have automatic funding certainty written into the constitution, while the state forces created by the same constitutional alteration exercise will depend on a grants process whose terms are entirely undefined.
Kalu’s Assurance and Its Limits
Deputy Speaker Benjamin Kalu acknowledged the funding gap directly when he briefed journalists in Abuja after returning from engagements at Chatham House in London. Responding to concerns about whether states could financially sustain police forces, Kalu said lawmakers were “tidying up the space” to ensure funding did not become an obstacle. “We are looking at how to make sure that funding will not be a problem with regard to state policing,” he said.
His primary argument rested not on a new revenue mechanism but on existing federal transfers. He pointed to what he described as record levels of federal allocations to states under the Tinubu administration and suggested that governors could redirect part of those funds to policing. “It wouldn’t be out of place if the president said, ‘I’m already sending the states a lot of money. Part of it should be used for this,’” he said.
He also noted that allocations to defence have risen from approximately ¦ 2.1 trillion to more than ¦ 5 trillion under the current administration, framing this as evidence of political will to back security reform with money though defence spending and State Police grants are distinct things.
Kalu was candid that the specific mechanisms were not yet resolved. “We’ll figure it out in the coming days,” he said, adding that the recess period was being used to “crack our heads to see how we can put the bricks properly.” The plain reading of that statement is that the legislature has not yet identified a binding or formulaic solution to the funding question, even as the constitutional amendment moves forward.
The Police Act: Where the Detail Must Come
Kalu did, however, point to the instrument where the financial mechanics are more likely to appear. He confirmed that the constitutional amendment will be followed by a consequential repeal and re-enactment of the Police Act, which would provide the “legal framework for implementing state policing and address operational concerns raised by Nigerians.”
The Police Act is the natural home for funding formulas, grant criteria, fiscal accountability requirements, and the minimum standards certification process. It can be amended more easily than the constitution and can accommodate the kind of numerical and procedural specificity a constitutional clause cannot.
That said, the sequencing carries its own risk. The constitutional amendment, if passed, brings State Police into legal existence as a constitutional institution.
The pressure to operationalise will be immediate, particularly in states that have long championed the reform. But the funding mechanics that should underpin operationalisation will not arrive until the Police Act, a separate, subsequent legislative exercise is completed. If that legislation is delayed, or if it emerges from the National Assembly with weaker fiscal protections than advocates hope, states will find themselves constitutionally empowered to establish police forces with no clear answer on how to pay for them beyond the annual scramble for federal grants.
The Inequality Problem
The current framework, taken as a whole, embeds a structural inequality that neither the bill nor Kalu’s public remarks fully address. States that can self-finance a police force, largely the wealthier, more commercially active states in the south will be able to establish, equip, and staff a competitive force relatively quickly, potentially without needing to lean on federal grants at all. States that cannot self-finance concentrated in the north and the Middle Belt, where security needs are often most acute, will be dependent on a federal grants process they do not control.
This creates the possibility of a dual-speed transition in which states with the greatest resources move fastest, while those with the greatest need remain longest under a Federal Police whose resourcing and deployment priorities are set in Abuja.
The bill’s safeguard that the Federal Police continues to operate in any state where a State Police is not yet certified ensures that no state is left without policing. But it also means the transition’s pace will be inversely correlated with fiscal capacity, unless the coming Police Act legislation addresses this directly through equalisation grants or weighted funding formulas. For now, that question rests entirely on the Deputy Speaker’s assurance that it will be figured out in the coming days.
