The AU must move beyond the binary of strict suspension or unconditional recognition, argues SAMI ABDELHALIM SAEED
Following the military coup in Sudan on October 25th, 2021, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), who dissolved the transitional government and declared a state of emergency, the African Union (AU) suspended Sudan’s membership on October 27, 2021. As of February 2026, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) has reaffirmed that the suspension remains in effect until a democratic transitional government is restored in the country. The AU faces a critical challenge as it seeks to balance its policy of “Zero Tolerance” against unconstitutional changes of government with the urgent and pressing needs of the continent’s peace and security. As AU-PSC considers a spectrum of diplomatic strategies, from strict compliance to constitutional frameworks and pragmatic, incremental normalisation with the de facto government, the status of Sudan’s membership is a pivotal test of the AU’s capacity to uphold its core principles amid a profound internal armed conflict and humanitarian crisis. Given the importance of peace and the maintenance of constitutionalism in Sudan, this article offers alternatives for policymakers at the national and AU levels. It draws on the case of Sudan to inform policy reforms, with a focus on political pragmatism.
Maintaining Sudan’s suspension upholds the AU’s principles but limits its capacity for effective peacebuilding. This isolation creates a strategic dilemma, as the AU-PSC loses influence on other mediation efforts and lacks sufficient on-the-ground monitoring. Similar challenges have occurred in Mali, where the AU’s focus on constitutionalism has conflicted with broader peace and security goals. By excluding Sudan’s de facto authorities, the AU cannot facilitate inclusive dialogue or coordinate regional security efforts, thereby prioritising constitutional principles over practical mediation.
The worsening humanitarian crisis in Sudan is increasing instability across the already fragile sub-Saharan region. The African Union’s peacebuilding strategy for Sudan remains unclear. Although the AU has engaged diplomatically with the de facto government, these efforts have not eased the ongoing humanitarian emergency.
The AU has several distinct options for navigating the restoration of Sudan’s membership while balancing legal mandates with regional stability.
First, the AU’s PSC upholds the principles of the USG, ACDEG, and the Lomé Declaration, applies a step-by-step approach to diplomacy, and limits Sudan’s membership to technical committees. To restore its membership in the AU, Sudan must adhere to the AU’s “Zero Tolerance” policy for Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG). In fact, this is the current situation as the Council applied this option at its February 2026 meeting. The AU demands an immediate and permanent ceasefire between the SAF and RSF, followed by an inclusive, Sudanese-led national dialogue to establish a civilian transitional authority. This approach rejects legitimising the 2021 military coup and recognises the current government in Port Sudan as a de facto authority, aligning with the United Nations’ stance.
The AU’s PSC strongly condemned the role of the national military in the ongoing human rights violations and confirmed that Sudan’s suspension will remain in place until a democratic transitional authority is restored in the country. Although Sudan’s Prime Minister Kamil Idris proposed a ceasefire monitored by the UN, the AU, and the Arab League, the AU rejected the proposal because it did not include a process to establish a civilian-led government.
Second, the AU might establish formal procedures to legitimise Sudan’s current military leadership. In such an attempt, the organisation might consider a strategy similar to its reinstatement of Egypt’s membership in June 2014, following the 2013 military coup against President Mohamed Mursi. In Egypt’s case, the suspension was lifted after a transitional roadmap, including a new constitution and scheduled elections, which were deemed sufficient to restore constitutional order. This precedent may help Sudan persuade the AU to restore its membership. However, criticised the AU’s decision regarding Egypt as overly lenient and primarily focused on maintaining stability for a major member state. The AU may find this approach preferable, as it upholds constitutional standards in Africa while addressing peacebuilding and security. However, the situation in Sudan remains a major security challenge in the Horn of Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Central Africa. The African Union’s decision to readmit Egypt in 2014 was widely criticised, with some arguing that it prioritised political interests over democratic development. Additionally, this option to legalise the current military leadership in Sudan faces legal obstacles, including Article 25(4) of ACDEG, which provides that coup perpetrators cannot participate in elections to restore constitutional order.
Third, the AU’s PSC may engage in international peace initiatives for Sudan, including those led by the United States or mandated by the United Nations Security Council, as exemplified by the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1769 (2007). In these contexts, AU functions as a regional actor facilitating the implementation of peace processes. This role may require adjustments to the AU’s legal framework to uphold international peace and security better. The AU may also condition its involvement in political settlements by employing a step-by-step strategy. This approach entails negotiating agreements in which military leaders commit to relinquishing power. Such a strategy enables concurrent advancement toward both peace and democratic governance.
The AU continues to navigate a complex path between upholding its foundational anti-coup framework and the practical necessity of regional mediation. While the “step-by-step” strategy and informal consultations allow the AU to maintain a degree of diplomatic influence, the ongoing suspension of Sudan reflects a steadfast commitment to the principles of the Lomé Declaration and the ACDEG. Ultimately, the restoration of Sudan’s membership will likely depend on an inclusive transitional framework that addresses both peace and democracy, ensuring a verifiable return to constitutional, civilian-led governance as a prerequisite for full reinstatement.
As a Chatham House report indicates, Sudan under warlords is not only a humanitarian catastrophe and a high risk to the Horn of Africa and the sub-Saharan region, but also a defining test for the AU and its obligation to uphold the principles of constitutional order and civilian protection. As violence escalates across the country, failure to act decisively risks furthering Sudan’s fragmentation. It would also be a damning indictment of the AU’s capacity to respond when African lives are in peril.
In conclusion, the AU stands at a critical juncture where the cost of inaction may soon outweigh the price of political settlement. The internal armed conflict in Sudan is no longer merely a civil war and a competition for power, but a fundamental challenge to the AU’s institutional identity and its “African solutions to African problems” notion. To break the current deadlock, the AU must move beyond the binary of strict suspension or unconditional recognition. By adopting a pragmatic roadmap that treats humanitarian access and security coordination as an immediate priority while holding civilian-led governance as the non-negotiable finish line, the AU can reclaim its role as a decisive mediator. Sudan’s path back to the AU will be found only through an innovative approach and a reinvigorated policy that proves the continent’s leading organisation can maintain its constitutional principles while protecting the lives of Africans.
Dr Saeed is an African constitutional expert and rule-of-law scholar with over 15 years of experience advising United Nations missions on peacebuilding and legal reforms in post-conflict environments
